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Abstract: An industrial deregulation is a government policy in developing a state’s economic 
infrastructure. If a country undergoes a process of powerful personalization, its interest is 
identical with a powerful interest. For an economic profit, the President’s relative and crony 
do a business and build directly unproductive seeking activities. This study aims to examine 
the relation of relative to crony in realizing an industrial deregulation in the 1980s and its 
impact on the Indonesian economy in a view of macroeconomic policy. It focuses on a problem 
of the industrial deregulation from 1983 to 1990 with economic growth by the indicator of 
contribution to GDP and labor force. The study used an expose facto approach. The data were 
the secondary sources: documents, textbooks and mass media. It used a qualitative-descriptive 
analysis. 
Keywords: nepotism, industrial deregulation, crony in business, economic bankruptcy 
Abstrak: Deregulasi industri merupakan kebijakan pemerintah dalam membangun infra-
struktur perekonomian negara. Manakala negara mengalami proses personalisasi kekuasaan, 
ketika itulah kepentingan negara nyaris identik dengan kepentingan penguasa. Kepentingan 
ekonomi yang berlanjut dengan keterlibatan kerabat dan teman dekat presiden ke dalam dunia 
bisnis, menyuburkan praktek directly unproductive profit seeking activities, yakni aktivitas 
yang mengarah pada mencari keuntungan tanpa usaha produktif. Tujuan penulisan ini untuk 
mengungkapkan awal mula praktek hubungan perkerabatan dan perkoncoan dalam pelaksa-
naan deregulasi industri pada tahun 1980-an dan dampaknya terhadap perekonomian Indone-
sia ditinjau dari sudut macro economic policy. Tujuan tersebut disederhanakan dengan fokus 
mengenai persoalan deregulasi industri antara tahun 1983-1990 terhadap pertumbuhan eko-
nomi dengan indikator kontribusi terhadap GDP dan penyerapan tenaga kerja. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan pendekatan penelitian exspose facto. Data diperoleh dan dikumpulkan dari 
sumber-sumber sekunder yaitu buku-buku bacaan, dokumen-dokumen dan penerbitan mass 
media oleh sebab itu penelitian ini tergolong penelitian leterer. Alat analisis data yang 
digunakan analisis diskriptif kualitatif. 
Kata kunci: nepotisme, deregulasi industri, kroni bisnis, kebangkrutan ekonomi 
INTRODUCTION 
In a very optimistic sense and due to the praise 
of various world institutions, the government of 
the New Order (1966-1997) was very ambitious 
to be parallel with the group of the new indus-
trialized countries in Asian area; and ulti-
mately, it would be a country with a new giant 
economy. It is noted that the new industrialized 
countries were South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore (Mustafa Dakian, 2005: 2). 
To complete that, the government of the 
New Order designed a framework that re-
flected a sequence of the actions. This article 
will present an evident analysis that leads to a 
conclusion: between the economic-politic blue 
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print and its implementation had conically dis-
torted. The event focused on the second decade 
(in the 1980s). In line with launching an indus-
trial deregulation policy, the distortion was in a 
very serious happening. In the next years, it 
was more and more increasingly serious so that 
the ambition could not was totally reached be-
cause of economic crisis in the 1990s.  
Since the development acceleration and 
modernization in Indonesia in the 1970s, an in-
dustrial sector quickly shifted other sectors, 
particularly agriculture, to contribute to na-
tional income. To reach the ambition, the era of 
Soeharto government had deregulated in an 
industrial sector since 1983. In the early, its 
process seemed positive (Muhamad Hisyam, 
2003: 229). One of the indicators was the Indo-
nesian economic growth in the late 1980 on the 
average of the developed countries’ (Muhamad 
Hisyam, 2003: 229).  
The deregulation could not be free from the 
framework of the New Order development ide-
ology that essentially used three approaches: 
political order approach, economic technocratic 
approach, and dependency approach (Robison, 
1990: 32-33). The political order approach re-
sults in a high effort to emphasize the factors in 
political stability rather than other stabilities 
such as economic when launching an industrial 
deregulation. Therefore, the government plays 
a very high role in it 
When the country undergoes process of 
powerful personalization, its interest is nearly 
identical with the powerful one, i.e., the Presi-
dent Soeharto (Fatah, 2004: 335). Similarly, in 
the economic field, the nepotism and ‘crony’ of 
the President Soeharto developed in a business 
and even participated centrally in taking a deci-
sion. As a result, an industrial deregulation was 
subject to a business of nepotism and crony. 
The economic technocratic approach tends 
to use the integration of neoclassical-interven-
tionist school where it is very oriented to mar-
ket on one side and the government tends to 
regulate it on the other side. The dependency 
approach makes an industrial policy depend on 
capital, professional worker, raw material and 
foreign market.  
The distortion in employing the ap-
proaches makes an industrial deregulation be-
ginning in the 1980s took place. An effort for 
increasing efficiency by developing a large-
sized industry will merely develop directly un-
productive profit seeking activities. 
The activities can probably be done 
through crony and nepotism. If so, who has an 
opportunity? In the system of the New Order 
government, the executive (the President), the 
President’s family, his business counterparts 
such as the Chinese offspring had distorted the 
policy. 
The business counterparts had been a 
crony since the era of the Independence war. 
They had financially and logistically supported 
to General Soeharto and his troops so that the 
relation between them could be said to be 
‘gratitude.’ Two of the influential Chinese 
counterparts, for example, were Liem Sioe 
Liong who possessed 350 firms in 1989 and 
Kian Seng (Bob Hasan) who possessed 110 
firms (Mallarangeng, 2008: 190) .  
The distortion of the industrial deregula-
tion policy seemed paradoxical when the mo-
nopolistic and oligopolistic markets and pro-
tectionism policy in domestic industry was un-
reasonable. Then, the protectionism policy re-
sulted in ‘channels’ that caused a ‘businessman’ 
who takes an uncompetitive profit of the Toll 
Gate Business to be able to run more flexibly 
through the connection of the politic elites, par-
ticularly through the Family of Cendana. 1 
Ultimately, it is historically proved that the 
practice of the 1980s negative externality of in-
dustrial deregulation had significantly caused 
the Indonesian economic fall in the late 1990s 
and forced the President Soeharto to retire his 
post on May 1998. 2 
Referring to the problem above, this article 
will describe a practice of the relationship be-
tween nepotism and crony in realizing an in-
dustrial deregulation in the 1980s and its impact 
on the Indonesian economy in a view of macro-
economic policy. In a sociological perspective, 
however, it emphasizes micro sociology rather 
                                                        
1  The Cendana’s family is a term referring to the name of 
street where the President Soeharto lived. 
2  Adi Sasono, an Interview with Adi Sasono (liem Siok Lan), 
Siok Lan Liem. 2008, Leading to people in sovereignty: an 
Interview with Adi Sasono, the Head of the Indonesian 
Cooperation. Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, p. 54. 
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than macro sociology. The micro sociology can 
be defined as sociology that studies a variety of 
thinking ways and behavior of the small groups 
(Liliweri, 2005: 152). The micro sociology stud-
ies a decision-making process, integration of 
nepotism groups, and influence of a group’s 
member on his or her insight of environment. 
In the Indonesian micro sociology, the re-
lationship of nepotism to crony has not been 
actualized yet. It is different from other studies 
such as the relation of patron-to-client, patri-
monial and bureaucratic politic.  
Nepotism and crony that have become into 
being since the 1997 reformation era are a pub-
lic discourse (Budi Winarno, 2007: 52) although 
it has existed since the Soeharto government era 
and even before the era. The practice of nepo-
tism has begun since the 1970s when Soeharto’s 
children, relative and his friends’ children have 
been adults. Then, they have done a business 
and become a member of Golkar (the Group of 
Functionaries, a political party established by 
government for technocrats and civil servants) 
(Junaidi Muadzin, 2009: 4). 
This study examined a problem of the 
1983-to-1990 industrial deregulation. It used an 
expose facto approach. The data were the sec-
ondary sources: documents, textbooks and mass 
media. It used a qualitative-descriptive analysis. 
DISCUSSION 
An Industrial Sector: Analysis Of Macro-
economic Policy 
Since the 1970s, one of the indicators for 
economic development successfulness has been 
economic transformation dominated by an 
industrial sector. It can be seen from its 
contribution to GDP, labor force, and economic 
growth. 3 
The schools for an industrial sector devel-
opment are neoclassical and interventionist. 
                                                        
3  The discussion on economic transformation can be seen in 
Chenery, 1960, "Pattern of Industrial Growth, American 
Economic Review". Vol. 50, pp.624-654. By using a cross-
section scale, found that an increasing higher a country’s 
income per capita, an increasing greater its industrial sector 
in a view of the contribution to GDP and economic growth, 
and labor force. 
The neoclassical school is an incentive-central-
ized trade, not distinguishing a domestic mar-
ket from international one. It believes that by 
applying an incentive-centralized trade, a pro-
ductive resource will penetrate economic sec-
tors with a high international competition. 
The essential assumptions include: (1) a 
market will work efficiently and government 
intervention always decreases welfare; (2) re-
source allocation will be optimal if the ‘busi-
nessman’ think about a market rule; and (3) 
government intervention is not needed so that a 
market will work well.  
In an industrial sector development, this 
school is supported by macroeconomic reality, 
an import substitution strategy tends anti-ex-
port, and a manufacturing firm does not accept 
goods export because a domestic market can 
result in high profit. 
In the interventionist school, intervention is 
needed to change a country’s comparative ad-
vantage. This school states that an industrial 
policy is neutral. It is an effective way of shift-
ing an industrial structure to a more sophisti-
cated industry that can generally result in ad-
vantage and efficiency through a “learning pro-
cess.” 4 
The successfulness of the new industrial 
countries in the firstier East Asian NIES (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) in 
industrial sector development is intended to 
lead to a debate between the two schools. 
The neoclassical school suggests that the 
successfulness is due to open policy and neutral 
incentive; whereas the interventionist states that 
it is the intervention that encourages an indus-
trialization process so that it generally needs a 
‘no-neutral’ incentive. This intervention is 
needed because a market does often not work 
efficiently and it causes a market failure. 
The industrial policies of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are gener-
ally categorized as an efficient-selective policy. 
The intervention is oriented to overcome a 
market failure. To support an industrialization 
                                                        
4  The debate on economics school in Indonesia can be seen in 
Keynes or Friedman or both: An Essay in Macroeconomic 
Theory for Indonesia's in “The Indonesia Economy Col-
lected Papers”, Chapmen Publisher, Canberra, 1996, pp. 212-
22. 
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process, for instance, it needs to develop a tech-
nique and training for firm employees to pro-
duce internationally-competitive-high technol-
ogy goods. It is assumed that it is a reason the 
countries’ economy is highly oriented to out-
side and their income per capita is higher than 
the other Asian countries. 5 
The incomes per capita of South Korea, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong and Singapore in 1980 reached 
over US $4,000. The incomes per capita of Malaysia 
and Thailand were US $1,620 and US $670 and 
those of Indonesia and Philippine were US $430 and 
US $450 (see Table 1). 
The successfulness of the Firstier East 
                                                        
5 Dodaro’s Analysis, 1991, 'Comparative Advantage, Trade 
and Growth: Export-led Growth Revised', World Deve-
lopment. Vol. 18 No. 9 pp. 1153-1165 states that there is a 
high correlation of economic growth and industrial manu-
facturing proportion. 
Asian NIES had inspired Malaysia and Indone-
sia to be the second-tier East Asian NIES. In the 
industrialization field, Malaysia encouraged 
manufacturing and chemical industries and In-
donesia leapfrogged from ‘more manual labor’ 
industry to high technology one, for example 
airplane industry. Unfortunately, however, the 
1990 economic crisis caused the ambitious in-
dustrialization program not to be able to run 
smoothly. 
In a historical view of the 1975-1990 eco-
nomic transformation of the ASEAN countries, 
it had structurally changed significantly. The 
optimism of the countries to be NIEs was sup-
ported by the contribution data of industrial 
sector to increasingly higher GDP (see Table 2). 
In Table 2, a change in the Indonesian eco-
nomic structure was very fast. The rate of 
manufacturing industrial growth rose sharply. 
Table 1. A Classification of Trade Orientation-Based Economic Development  
 and Rate of Income Per Capita in 1980 
Outside-Trade Orientation Countries  Income Per Capita 
High Hong Kong  4,240 
 Singapore  4,430 
 Korea Selatan  4,520 
Medium Malaysia  1,620 
 Thailand  670 
Low Indonesia  430 
 Philippine  450 
 Source: Dodaro, 1991. p. 1154 
 
Table 2. A Change in GDP Structure in the 1975-1990 ASEAN Countries 
Countries  Years Agricultural 
Sector 
All Sectors  Manufacturing 
Industry 
Service 
Sector  
Indonesia  1975 36,8 27,2 11,1 35,9 
  1985 22,7 39,7 15,8 37,6 
  1990 19,6 40,9 19,3 39,5 
Malaysia  1975 27,7 26,8 16,4 45,5 
  1985 20,8 36,7 19,7 42,6 
  1990 18,7 42,2 26,9 39,0 
Philippine  1975 26,8 34,1 28,3 39,1 
  1985 24,6 35,1 25,2 40,4 
  1990 22,5 35,8 25,4 41,7 
Singapore  1975 1,5 37,2 26,0 61,3 
  1985 0,8 36,6 23,6 62,6 
  1990 0,3 36,6 29,0 63,1 
Thailand  1975 24,8 27,3 19,9 47,9 
  1985 19,9 29,9 20,7 50,1 
  1990 14,4 35,5 24,7 49,8 
Source: Asian Development Bank, in, 1993. p. 133 
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In 1975, it reached 11 percent and in 1990, it 
reached 19.3 percent of GDP. Malaysia and 
Thailand kept a growth rate of 8 percent per 
year and an economic growth of Philippine was 
about 0.5 percent per year. The GDP of Singa-
pore was dominated by manufacturing and 
services sectors. 
The growth of industrial sector decided a 
protection policy from year to year. The rate of 
effective protection by government can be seen 
in Table 3.  
From Table 3, among the sectors, the manu-
facturing industrial sector got the highest pro-
tection while the sectors with a negative sign 
such as forestry got some subsidy. The value of 
the forestry effective protection was negative 
because this sector subsidized a plywood in-
dustry sector. The high industrial sector pro-
tection indicates that Indonesia has an eco-
nomic policy focusing its economy on the in-
dustrial sector. 
The government’s protection generally is 
intended for a large-sized industry with capital 
intensive and skilled workers through output- 
and input-cost subsidy, tariff, and monopoly 
power. 6 Based on the level of employment pro-
vided by each economic sector, however, the 
job vacancy of this sector is very small. The 
Statistic Center Bureau reported that this sector 
only resulted 9.3 percent in 1985 and 11.4 in 
1990. Nevertheless, the policy remained to lead 
                                                        
6  The discussion of the government’s protection role in an 
industrial sector can be seen in Das (1998), Dodaro (1991), 
Kreinin and Plummer (1992), and Dean (1995). The early-
stage protection of industrialization is needed to improve a 
growing-industrial sector, or often referred as argument 
infant industry. 
to an industrial development although other 
sectors got a loss. More credits were allocated to 
this sector that other sectors. Furthermore, the 
industry with accessibility to foreign credit uses 
some credit distributed by government. 
The large employers (about 20 people) 
dominated 74.70 percent of the credits distrib-
uted by the government. The large differences 
between domestic interest rate to foreign inte-
rest rate was incentive for private sectors to 
expand their business with excessively-marked 
up warrant. Today, the value of rupiah ex-
change rate in US dollar is relatively low so that 
many people do an advantageous speculation 
practice. But, when the rupiah value is depre-
ciated, gain from the margin of this interest rate 
can’t compensate a loss. 7 The self-financing and 
provision of credits in large number to 
personally-owned firms increase more private 
debts. The privately-owned firms that do not 
pay for their debts, particularly in US dollar, 
make foreign debts be a domestic economy 
burden.  
                                                        
7 An exchange rate fluctuation impact on a price and 
macroeconomic activity was discussed by Papell (1994). A 
discussion of the cost and benefit of dollar use for paying an 
international trade was discussed by Schuler (1999). An in-
ternational interest rate ranged from 5% to 6% per year, but 
a credit interest rate in Indonesia ranged from 12% to 35%. 
Similarly, the bank and financial deregulations made the 
condition increasingly worse. Many industrial sector busi-
nessmen established a bank and did self financing, for ex-
ample, Liem Sio Liong, Sjamsul Nursalim, Eka Tipta Wijaya, 
Bambang Trihatmojo, and Boh Basan established BCA, 
BDNI, BII, Andromeda Bank, BUN etc., respectively. These 
banks distributed credits to the industrial sector firms. By 
operating a floating exchange rate, a gain of domestic-for-
eign interest rate was lower than a loss causing rupiah de-
preciation. 
Table 3. The Rate of Effective Protection for the 1980-1995 Indonesian Economic Sectors 
No. Economic Sectors  1984 1990 1992 1995 
A.  Agricultural Sector      
  1. Food Plant  18 20 20 15 
  2. Plantation  14 12 13 -1 
  3. Animal Husbandry  33 31 29 17 
  4. Forestry  -20 -43 -43 -53 
  5. Fishery  15 16 15 27 
B.  Mining      
  1. Oil-gas  -1 -1 -1 3 
  2. Non oil-gas  0 1 1 3 
C.  Industry  152 139 82 53 
Source: Fane, 1996 
 A Nepotism and Crony in a Business (Muhadjir Efendy) 123
A Relation of Nepotism to Crony in the 
Industrial Deregulation in the 1980s 
 As described above, the practice of nepotism 
and crony in a business is a kind of corruption 
because of the powerful personalization of 
state, mainly the presidential post more 
frequently causing a negative and inefficient 
externality. The focus of the problem is on 
discussing partially. However, this partial 
analysis can comprehensively be expected to 
describe what the practice of nepotism and 
crony took place in relation to the industrial 
deregulation policy in the 1980s.  
Partially, this article discusses a light in-
dustry, import regulation, mainly raw materi-
als, plastic-raw materials monopoly, steel con-
trol and distribution. For discussing these as-
pects, we used as main sources including such 
textbooks as Managing Indonesia: the Modern 
Political Economy by John Bresnan (Columbia 
University Press, 1993) and The Economy in 
Indonesia New Order: the Dynamics of Socioecono-
mic Transformation by Hall Hill (Allen & Unwin, 
1994).  
Light Industrial Sub-Sector. In the begin-
ning in the 1970s, John Bresnan stated that the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector was dominat-
ed by the factories producing consumption 
goods (foods, beverages, tobaccos and textiles 
in particular) that were competitive in the eco-
nomic crisis.  
In ten years later, the factories with large 
capitals were more competitive than those with 
small capitals. According to Hall Hill (1994), it 
is common in a majority of developed countries 
to lead to industrialized countries. It is mainly 
due to a very fast domestic market growth and 
the ambition of the countries to ‘find’ interna-
tional market share for raising their exports. 
The factories with large capitals produced fer-
tilizer, pharmacy, vehicle, electronic and ply-
wood.  
Unfortunately, in 1982 the domestic market 
for the products highly decreased. Conse-
quently, the program was intended to protect 
how the factories did not go bankruptcy. For 
this reason, it is necessary to take protection 
economic policies, including (1) a campaign for 
using domestic products, (2) very strict import 
control, and (3) new investment increasing.  
In the late 1980s, because of a change in a 
foreign exchange rate, to meet a short-run sup-
ply, a government’s policy was intended to (1) 
give a large chance of financial service business 
by involving domestic and foreign businesses, 
(2) ‘alleviate’ control for a large number of im-
port manufacturing products, and (3) facilitate 
foreign investments. All did not happen in 
1974. As a result, in the beginning of 1990, the 
investment, export volume and government’s 
income rose very fast.  
The action taking by the government re-
sulted in a regulation process that was particu-
larly intended to take a protection action on one 
side and a deregulation process that was in-
tended to accelerate a performance of expand-
ing an industrial sector on the other side. 
However, the processes were a portrait of 
interest conflict in power for the officials con-
sisting of families and their business cronies. It 
caused a debate of (1) public sector in the fu-
ture, (2) dominant business groups of Chinese 
offspring in the private sector, and (3) better 
positions for the President’s families, close rela-
tives and business cronies. 8  
Import Regulation. Rice import has been 
monopolized by Bulog (Logistic Agency), state-
owned agency since the early of New Order 
government. In the years later, it also imports 
other food products. 
The import of manufacturing products was 
limited, such as vehicles, to protect a domestic 
manufacturing industry. Other products that 
could be imported the Holding Company hav-
ing a license of Industry and Trade Ministry 
were raw materials needed for a production 
process.  
The system of new trade was introduced in 
1982. This sets a list of raw materials compo-
nent and product that could be imported by 
agencies. These were agricultural products such 
as cotton, flour, milk, crop in dry season, clove 
and sugar. In the forthcoming time, it also per-
mits to import such products as iron, steel, 
plastic, chemical, textile, paint, rubber, paper, 
glass, vehicle and machine.  
                                                        
8  The Grand Son Also Rises by Hans Vriens in Journal Asia, Inc, 
edition Marc 1995. In his work, Vreins stated that the President 
Soeharto’s family can only be competitive with Sultan Brunei in 
building the richest family’s business dynasty throughout the 
world. 
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In the beginning of 1986, the import license 
controlled 1,484 kinds of products (goods). 
Among 1,360 manufacturing products, 296 pro-
ducts were imported. The products valued US 
$2.7, a half of total import (Bresnan, 1993: 247).  
An import license is not occasionally based 
on import trade whereas other licenses are 
based on specific types and products in num-
ber. But, the other license is determined by its 
import agency. The trade order is frequently 
conducted by state-owned agencies and pri-
vate-owned companies. Some state-owned 
companies (for example, PT Krakatau Steel) re-
sponsible for controlling products and their us-
ers are in charge of controlling 82 kinds of steel 
and iron.  
Briefly, economy was strongly protected 
during the recession in the beginning of 1980s. 
Some the officials of Economic Ministry did not 
think about such private sector as a foreign in-
vestor who neglected a trade system. But, the 
Industrial Minister believed a program in-
structed by the President. There was a great de-
bate of import substitution vs. export promo-
tion. Some members of governmental cabinets 
did not trust an issue of the export. Unfortu-
nately, however, they did not find any alterna-
tive to solve the problem.  
Mohammad Sadli, one of the former Min-
isters of the New Order government, stated that 
the government set a quota because of GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades) 
charging a high tariff and it would result in 
more losses. The other consideration was a 
trade system through this import monopoly 
where a firm could accumulate capital and it is 
ultimately expected that it could expand to 
build a factory ‘operating’ industrial raw mate-
rials in the home.  
Plastic Raw Material Monopoly. A degree 
of the Trade Minister on October stated an im-
port of various raw materials for plastic indus-
try was under governmental control. These 
materials included (1) polyethylene for pro-
ducing household furnishings made of plastics, 
(2) polypropylene for producing plastic bags, 
food packages and the like, (3) polystyrene for 
plastic glass materials, (4) polyvinyl for pro-
ducing plastic pipes, and (5) acetate and acrylic.  
Those materials were only imported by 
three state-owned corporations: PT Panca Ni-
aga, PT Cipta Niaga and PT Mega Eltra in 
which they got any subsidy from the Trade 
Ministry. Each got the same quota in a ton for a 
kind of materials (Bresnan, 1993: 248-249). The 
new policy was intended to assure a survival of 
operating domestic plastic industry by provi-
ding raw materials, particularly imported ones.  
The total of the last four raw materials 
were US $361 million in 1984. The raw materials 
of polyethylene and polypropylene reached US 
$300 million. The two could not be produced in 
Indonesia but the others could. In a joint ven-
ture with Japanese firms, Indonesian firms pro-
duced polyvinyl and polystyrene. The polysty-
rene was produce by PT Polychemlindo, one of 
the firms of PT Bimantara Group owned by the 
President Soeharto’s son.  
The decree of the Trade Minister above an-
nounced that on March 1985 the three state-
owned corporations instructed Panca Ltd, one 
of the private firms as an agent for all plastic 
imports, headquartered in Hong Kong, where it 
was headed by Sudwikatmono, the President 
Soeharto’s crony.  
Steve Jones of the Asian Wall Street Journal 
headquartered in Hong Kong reported that 
based on the data, the Panca Holding belonged 
to two firms registered in Vanuatu where the 
President Soeharto’s two sons, Bambang Triat-
modjo and Sigit Haryo Yudanto, became a 
board member of director. 9  
The government charged about US $23 per 
ton while the Panca Holding did US $20 per ton 
and it ultimately raised US $70 per ton plus 2 
percent of transaction value. In 1986, the sale of 
polyethylene reached US $500 per ton. This 
‘mark-up’ was added 21 percent of import cost.  
Some executives’ survey showed that this 
system was illogical. Some consumers remain to 
directly corporate with foreign suppliers and 
did not use a bureau of governmental trade or 
with the Panca Holding but they directly met 
these suppliers.  
Nevertheless, it could not run effectively 
because it took one month before order. The 
                                                        
9  A supplier’s license developed into a producer thorugh PT 
Candar Asri finding the protection’s government. However, 
the Financial Minister stated that the supplier would not 
find a protection. 
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firms sent goods to the consumers before they 
received a document. It means to spend more 
cost for saving.  
It is estimated that as a monopoly holder in 
1985 the Panca Holding with ‘Tollgate business’ 
could gain a profit of US $30 million.  
On August 1986, when the government 
announced that the only one state-owned cor-
poration, PT Mega Eltra, that operated a plastic 
quota and kept the Panca Holding as an agent, 
the industry was uncompetitive. In the end of 
1986, the devaluation made the price of the im-
ported products in the home higher. The state-
owned corporation and the Pasca Holding 
could not gain a large profit by decreasing 
‘mark-up’ at a half. This was intended to ‘aid’ a 
survival for industry.  
In brief, the monopoly of plastic product 
transparency was relatively very small. With 
the protection of local industry and monopoly 
of importing raw materials to a given firm, it 
only means to raise a profit for the President 
Soeharto’s relatives.  
A Control and Steel Distribution. A state-
owned corporation, PT Krakatau Steel, has an 
authority to control steel import and steel pro-
duction. It is based on the President’s decree. 
This decree is intended to (1) protect a domestic 
market for PT Krakatau Steel’s steel products, 
(2) prevent importers from smuggling steels by 
counterfeiting for a low tariff, and (3) prevent 
steel consumers in the home from cooperating 
with Japanese firms, particularly automotive 
corporation and steel suppliers.  
For this monopoly, Indonesia can’t set a 
competitive steel price. Many decisions made 
by the officials of Trade Ministry were intended 
for some firms that served as an agent of PT 
Krakatau Steel to import and distribute the 
steels in the home.  
On April 1984, PT Giwang Selogam could 
import cold-rolled steel on behalf of PT Kraka-
tau Steel. In cooperation with PT Krakatau 
Steel, the company had also had other busines-
ses. PT Krakatau Steel controlled hot-rolled 
steel in various forms whereas PT Giwang 
Selogam controlled cold-rolled steel import and 
a product of PT Krakata Steel’s branch begin-
ning to operate in 1987.  
This import monopoly could result in a 
profit of US $20 per ton and a 2.5 percent-cost of 
the total sales value. Between 1984 and 1985, 
when the value of imported cold-rolled steel 
was more than US $400 million, the profit of 
monopoly was nearly the same as that of the 
plastic sector monopoly.  
The director board of PT Giwang Selogam 
was Liem Sioe Liong, who held a 20 percent 
share, and its executive director was Sudwi-
katmoko, the President Soeharto’s crony, who 
held a 6.7 percent share. The other shares were 
held by the President Soeharto’s family and 
business association under control of Liem Sioe 
Liong. He got a large profit of cold rolle steel 
when PT Cold Rolling Mill Indonesia, a joint 
venture of PT Krakatau Steel with Liem Sioe 
Liong, began producing in 1987.  
In its report of 1986, the World Bank esti-
mated that an added steel import cost reached 
25 percent-45 percent above an average of in-
ternational price. According to its consumers, a 
majority of monopolized-imported steel could 
be through the Javanese firms exclusively at a 
lower price. Likewise, a time taking for placing 
an order of steel through Krakatau was 7 
months, twice in comparison to buy the steel at 
the Javanese firms.  
In consideration with the industrial sector 
development and in comparison to a country’s 
competition, it could be seen that we did not 
nearly have any chance. A country’s commo-
dity competition is determined by price, quality 
and timing.  
A Chinese Business Group’s Role. In com-
parison to a state sector, a private sector has a 
chance in a policy agenda in the later. The gov-
ernment tries to promote an indigenous busi-
nessman through some programs but a private 
businessman essentially gets less attention from 
the government and always needs to be in-
structed in its business activity.  
The fourth five-year plan, announced in the 
early of 1984, began considering this private 
sector. In the plan, the government expected 
that the private sector could result in 9 million 
of new labor forces. Thus, an economic growth 
must be raised at 5 percent. For this, it needs an 
investment of Rp142.2 trillion but the govern-
ment only provided a half of the total invest-
ment. So, the private sector must generate an 
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investment of Rp67.5 trillion.  
Then, who were the private businessmen? 
The Tempo Magazine, an influential magazine 
in the era, reported that not all the private sec-
tors could support it. The ‘giant’ businessmen 
such as Liem Sioe Liong, William Soeryadjaya, 
Lie Siong Thay, The Nin King, Sjamsul Nur-
salim – all of the Chinese offspring - were peo-
ple who could support it.  
A high expectation to develop the indige-
nous private firms could never be realized after 
they were unsuccessful in the 1950s through 
‘Benteng (Castle) program.’ Since the era, espe-
cially in the President Soeharto’s government, 
the Chinese ethnicity dominated a business and 
commercial sector. This ethnicity was increas-
ingly stronger. According to Richard Robison, it 
was due to a reliable and wide family’s trade 
system that built a very well-distributed and 
credited network in the home and that was re-
lated to the Chinese business groups in the area 
of ASEAN. He also thought that an increasing 
higher military-political role put a number of 
the Chinese capitalists into a role as a fund pro-
vider and operator for military officers (Robi-
son, 1988: 271-273).  
The relation of the government to the Chi-
nese business groups was controversial. The 
government encouraged the indigenous private 
businessmen but it cooperated with the Chinese 
business groups in investments. These invest-
ments could be a production cement, flour, 
chemical, paper, petrochemical, fertilizers, 
pharmacy, voyage, electrical power, and min-
ing.  
It was estimated that one-third of the 
stated-owned bank loan were dominated by the 
Chinese business in secret relation to military 
and civil officials. Besides the Chinese offspring 
businessmen, of course, there were some in-
digenous businessmen who were involved in 
the nepotism; although there were many Chi-
nese businessmen who did their businesses 
fairly. However, Kwik Kian Gie, a Chinese 
businessman and the former Head of National 
Planning Board in the era of Megawati gov-
ernment recognized that among the Chinese 
businessmen were reasonably fallen into a ‘bad 
conglomerate.’  
The history of successful-economic deve-
lopment of the New Industrialized Countries in 
Asia for the first generation, including South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, has 
been discussed by such economists as James, 
Naya and Meier (1989). One of the lessons, par-
ticularly in Taiwan and South Korea, shows 
that an economic transformation from agricul-
ture to industry needs resources. Its conse-
quence can be more negative if an industrial 
sector is protected excessively and there takes a 
place of negative externality. In the operation of 
industrial deregulation in the 1980s, it seems 
that the thesis is clear, i.e., the negative exter-
nality has taken a place from a policy-making 
central level to implementation system. The 
externality begins from a process of state per-
sonalization to a nepotism business activity and 
crony system that are conducted by the Presi-
dent Soeharto’s family, relatives and cronies.  
In a view of macroeconomic policy and real 
sectors when the industrial deregulation in the 
1980s was enforced, it is proved that the fun-
damental industrial sector in Indonesia is very 
‘fragile.’ In fact, the large industries grow in 
foot loose industry, using raw materials and 
foreign labor force so that it is very intensively 
import. The large businessmen in the limited 
amount with access to foreign credit dominated 
at 74.70 percent of the government’s total credit 
while the rest for small- and middle-sized ones. 
Many of businesses in the industrial sectors re-
main to be protected by the government with 
the argument of an infant industry that finally 
becomes an old baby industry. Many large-
sized businesses in the industrial sectors do rent 
seeking through monopoly. The large busi-
nesses by the government’s protection with a 
monopoly are expected to compete in an inter-
national market, but they can only be competi-
tive in the home. A drive of large-sized indus-
trial development in de facto highly depends on 
some large businessmen.  
CONCLUSION 
It can be concluded that what the industrial 
deregulation in the 1980s with all the policies 
and the practices of crony and nepotism are, it 
has very highly driven to the Indonesian eco-
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nomic bankruptcy since 1990s. In addition, the 
deregulation policy has made the President 
Soeharto topple down. He stepped down his 
office after 32 years in power, exactly on May 
12, 1998. However, many people think that 
Soeharto is one of the best citizens for Indone-
sian people, and it seems that he will be the 
only person who has powered for a long time in 
the history of presidency of Indonesian Repub-
lic.  
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